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ABSTRACT
The simplest target selection problem in heterogeneous
combat is the two-on-one battle. For a prescribed duration
battle, deterministic and stochastic models using
Lanchester's square law attrition mechanism are developed.
Solutions of these models, obtained by the application of
optimal control theory, are given, including the complete
solution of the deterministic model and the optimal
target selection rule and expected pay-off for special
cases of the stochastic model. A numerical approximation
for the general case of the stochastic model is obtained.
Comparison of numerical results shows that the target
selection rule specified by the deterministic models
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One of the chief functions of mathematical models
of combat is to provide insight for the development of
tactics. In general, the assumptions needed to make the
model tractable are such that the results cannot be direct-
ly applied. Frequently, however, the results reveal a
structure which is obscured by the complexity of the real
world problem.
There are a number of different approaches to combat
attrition modeling, each with its own advantages and dis-
advantages. Generally speaking, greater reality is intro-
duced into such models at the expense of increased
complexity
.
A factor to be considered is whether the results are
influenced by the approach used. It may be that for a
particular type of problem, a complex, difficult approach
yields nothing that could not be gained from a simpler
model
.
One of the first mathematical models of combat was
presented by Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, USN, in
1905 [1]. Fiske considered an engagement between two
fleets. He assigned a numerical value representing strength
to each fleet and assumed that the damage a fleet could
inflict was proportional to its strength. In a series
of tables, he showed that the value of the weaker fleet

in relation to the stronger fleet decreased at an acceler-
ating rate as the battle progressed. Fiske's logical
development and conclusions are the same as those later
formalized by Lanchester.
Pioneering work on combat attrition modelling was done
by F. W. Lanchester [2] in the early nineteen hundreds.
He postulated that the combat attrition process could be
described by a system of ordinary differential equations.
Lanchester considered two types of combat: individual
combat as represented by ancient combat; and modern com-
bat characterized by the introduction of weapons with
large firepower.
Letting x(t) and y(t) represent the opposing force
levels, in the first case, the attrition depends on both
force levels and is given by
|| = -ax(t)y(t) (1)
|£ = -bx(t)y(t) (2)
where a and b are called Lanchester attrition-rate coeffi-
cients. Dividing Eq . 1 by Eq. 2 and integrating yields
the force level equation:
b(x(0) - x(t)) = a(y(0) - y(t))
which is known as the Lanchester linear law. If x is to
win (x(t) > 0, y(t) = 0) , then the initial force levels
must satisfy

x(0) > | y(0)
In the second case, the attrition depends only on the
opposing force level and is given by
g| - -bx(t)
Prom this system of equations, Lanchester ' s square law,
b(x 2 (0) - x 2 (t)) = a(y 2 (0) - y 2 (t))
is derived with the condition for x to win that
x
2 (0) > | y 2 (0).
Since Lanchester 's work, numerous extensions, modifica-
tions, etc., have been advanced. A survey of the work in
this area can be found in Dolansky [3].
An obvious drawback to the Lanchester formulations is
that they are deterministic. Given the attrition coeffi-
cient, the winner is determined by the initial force levels.
Clearly, this is not true in actual combat. There are a
great many other factors, which may be considered as random
variables, which enter into the determination. Apparently
the first stochastic formulation was given by Koopman [^,5].
Weiss [6] noted a number of deficiencies. Of particular
significance is the fact that the Lanchester model assumes
that all units on a side are of the same type (homogeneous

forces). In actual combat, there are units of many dif-
ferent types on each side (heterogeneous forces).
The simplest heterogeneous force model involves a
single force, Y, facing an opposing force composed of two
types of units, Xj and X 2 . The attrition structure is
described by some function of attrition coefficients and
force levels. The Y force commander faces an allocation
of fire problem. How should he divide his fire between
Xj and X a ?
. In the following, deterministic and stochastic models
of this problem are developed and the solution obtained
by application of optimal control theory is given. For
particular numerical values, the optimal allocation of
fire and the terminal pay-off are compared.

Table I. Notation
XjCt), x,(t) 9 y(t) -- State variables, number of survivors
of X la X 2 , Y at time t.
T — Specif ied 'maximum duration of the battle.





— Attrition coefficient, rate at which one y attrits X
}
a 2
— Rate at which one y attrits X 2 .
bj — Rate at which one x
x
attrits Y.
b 2 — Rate at which one x 2 attrits Y.
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II. THE DETERMINISTIC MODEL
The development of the model requires three major
decisions. An objective function must be chosen. A stop-
ping rule must be defined and the structure of the attrition
mechanism selected.
Among the Y force commander's objectives might be to
maximize casualties inflicted, minimize the casualties
incurred or to maximize the duration of the battle. The
objective function used in this model is
max ry(T) - px (T) - qx 2 (T)
that is, the Y force commander desires to allocate his
forces to maximize the net worth of the survivors, the
terminal pay-off. Appropriate choices of the. weighting
factors, p, q, and r, reflect Y's feeling regarding casual-
ties. At one extreme, p and q set equal to zero correspond
to minimizing casualties incurred, while r set equal to
zero essentially maximizes casualties inflicted. It can
be shown that maximizing the duration of the battle leads
to a different allocation policy.
There are three ways in which the battle may end. One
force may decide to disengage, either as a function of
casualties incurred or after some specified time, or one
force may be driven to zero. In the deterministic formula-
tion, there is a one-to-one correspondence between casual-
ties and elapsed time.
10

The following stopping rule is used in this model.
With T specified, there are four states in which the battle-
can end:





y(t) = while either Xj(t) > or x
2
(t) > or
both for < t < T (Y loses).
C
3





(t) = y(t) = for 5 t < T (draw).
States C 2 to C^ are referred to as fight-to-the-finish or
terminal control battles, while C is a prescribed duration
battle. The model is formulated as a prescribed duration
battle with consideration given to premature terminations
(C 2 , C 3 , or Cj, If T is large enough, the premature
terminations will determine the actual time the battle ends
The attrition structure used is the Lanchester square
lav;. These choices lead to the following model.
max ry(T) - px
2
(T) - qx 2 (T) (3)
0<4><1
dx
ST -rr- = - Cf>a iy (t)dt
dx
- = - (1-4,) a.y(t) (4)dt
% = " (b^Ct) + b 2 x 2 (t))
l
> x 2 , y
> 0. T specified.
11

A number of assumptions are involved in the formulation
and use of the model.
Al. Each unit has perfect information regarding the
state and location of enemy units.
A2 . Fire may be shifted instantaneously.
A3. Fire is uniformly distributed over surviving units
kH . All enemy units are within range.
A5. The effects of successive rounds are independent.
A6. The attrition coefficients a
x ,
a 2 , b 1} b 2 are
constant throughout the battle.
A7 • Fractional casualties are allowed.




. Since the labelling of forces is
arbitrary, this is a nonrestrictive assumption.
Al through A 5 are inherent in the Lanchester square law
formulation, as developed by Barfoot [7].
This problem was first formulated and partially solved
by Isbell and Marlow [8], before Pontryagin announced his
maximum principle. Using subsequent developments in modern
optimal control theory, Taylor [9, 10] has obtained a




III. SOLUTION TO THE DETERMINISTIC MODEL
The derivation of Taylor's solution is exceedingly
lengthy and tedious. The results are summarized in Appen-
dix A. This section discusses Taylor's solution technique
and the insight into the structure of the optimal allocaticr.
policy provided by this solution.
The solution procedure begins by forming the Hamiltonian











where p , p , and p are the dual variables associated wit]
X 1? X 2 and Y respectively.
By the Pontryagin maximum principle
, maximizing Eq. 5
at all points in time yields the maximum of Eq. 3- Rewrit'
ing Eq . 5 as
















2 p 2 (t) > a x p x (t)
if a 2 p 2 (t) < ax p s (t)
(6)
This paper uses the American form of the maximum
principle [11]. Pontryagin, et . al., [12] use an equivaler. -
form which differs in sign conventions.
13

It can be shown that a 2 p 2 = d x ]? 1 cannot hold over a finite
interval of time, hence the optimal control is to always
concentrate fire against one target type.
The adjoint system of differential equations for the









2 P 3 (t) (?)
dp
3
^— = p 1 (t)a 1 <J> + p 2 (t)a 2 (l-(f))
When the optimal value function is differentiable, the
dual variables represent the change in the optimal value
function caused by a change in the corresponding state
variable. In particular, if no force has been driven to
zero at the end of the battle, the final values of the
dual variables are easily found. Differentiating Eq. 3
with respect to the state variables yields
Pj(T) - - p
P 2 (T) = - q
p 3 (T) = r.
If either X. or X
2
is driven to zero during the course
of the battle, the final values of the dual variables can
no longer be determined as above; instead, the theory of
state variable inequality constraints must be applied.
14

Taylor [Appendix E of 10] presents a detailed discussion
of this theory.
When a force is driven to zero, the optimal trajectory
is said to enter a constraint sub-arc. The point of entry
is called a corner. In this problem, a nonnegativity
constraint is binding on a constrained sub-arc. One treat-
ment, developed by Gamkrelidze [12] is to modify the
Hamiltonian by adjoining the first time derivative of the
constraints to the criterion functional with additional
Lagrange multipliers.









The y.'s are multipliers satisfying




as well as Gamkrelidze ' s condition
i = 1, 2
dt
< for x. =
l
There are also corner conditions on the dual variables
at an entrance to a constrained sub-arc. If X is driven
to zero at t
,
these are
P,(t;) = PjCtJ) + y
a
(t|)
P 2 (t;) = Pa <t;>
p,(t;) - p 3 (<)
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In addition, the Hamiltonian is continuous across the
corner. Approaching the corner (tj),
<t>
= l, p b x approache:
zero, and u.=0. After the corner (t^, <}>=0, Xj = 0, and
y 2
= 0. From the continuity of the Hamiltonian
H(t7) = - p 1 (t7)a 1 y - P 3 b 2 x 2





r-P 2 (tt) a p 2 ( tT)
On a constrained sub-arc with Xj=0, the multiplier is





Uj(t) = ~ (a













(a b - a b )
2 2 11
using the adjoint equations (Eq. 7) it is clear that
Gamkredlidze ' s condition is only satisfied on the con-




since it is readily
shown that p,(t) > 0.
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A similar argument shows that Gamkrelidze ' s condition
is satisfied on the constrained sub-arc x
2
=0 only if
a b < a b which contradicts A8. Therefore, it is optimal112 2 '
to drive X
z
to zero only at the end of the battle, if at all
Since the values of the dual variables are known for
t=T, it is convenient to define the backwards time variable






" dF~ 1 ~ > ' 5 K }
Substitution of Eq . 8 into Eq . 7 yields a system of differ-
ential equations with known initial conditions which can
be solved for the dual variables as a function of time.
Once the dual variable functions are found, the optimal
control is given by Eq. 6. The time at which fire is
switched from Xj to X 2 is found from
a
x pj (t) = a 2 p 2 (t)
.
The trajectories of the state variables are easily



















- (b lXl (
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which can be solved to get for tj 1 t 1 t 2
' (bjX^Ctj) + b 2 x 2 (t 2 ))





























) cosh ( /a j b j t
)


















|f = - (bjXjCt) + b 2 x 2 (t)dt




x 2 (t 3 ) given
y(t 3 ) given
x j ( t ) = x , (
1
3 )
x 2 (t) = x,(t,) a,-
'(b,x,(tj + b x (t )1
^ 1 1
v
3 2 2 3'
















































Neglecting drawn battles (terminal state C ,) the
terminal states can be partitioned as shown in Table II.
Using the optimal control determined by Eq. 6, the state
equations, Eqs. 9 and 10 can be integrated in forward time
to determine what combinations of parameters and initial
force levels can lead to particular terminal states.
These conditions define the domain of controllability.
Two additional items must be checked. First, the do-
mains of controllability must cover the entire state space.
If not, then there exists a singular surface where the
Pontryagin maximal principle does not apply and other
methods must be used to determine the optimal control.
Such a surface is not present in this problem.
Secondly, it may be that the domains of controllability
overlap. If this is the case, then the optimal control is
the one leading to the terminal state with the largest:
pay-off. Unless one terminal state dominates the other,
the region of overlap is partitioned by a dispersal surface
into subregions from which optimal extremals lead to a
particular terminal state.
Dispersal surfaces are present in this case. The
resolution of these areas can be found in Taylor [10]. As
this paper is primarily concerned with numerical results,
19

Table II. Terminal States









T : Specified duration of the battle.
Tj! Time battle actually ends.
SI - S3 partition C
l
(fixed-duration battle)
S4 - SG partition C 2 (Y loses)

















X 2 destroyed first.
the question is resolved by computing the pay-off for each
possible terminal state and choosing the maximum.
Insight into the allocation policy can be gained by




a 2 b 2 , ajP, and a 2 q. The quantity a 1 b 1 (a 2 b 2 ) is a strategic
or long term measure. It can be interpreted as a measure
of the rate at which Y destroys X^s (X 2 's) ability to
20

destroy Y. On the other hand, a
1
p(a
2 q) is a tactical or
short term measure, interpreted as the rate at which Y
destroys X 's (X
2









are two cases to consider.
If a.p > a
2 q, the situation is relatively simple.
Y receives more return in both the strategic and tactical
sense by firing at X,, hence it is never optimal to fire
at X 2 unless X x = 0. Accordingly, in this case, no
extremals lead to states S3, S6, or S8. For all other
terminal states, <J)* = 1 until X^O or Y=0.
Things are more complicated if a
2 p < a 2 q, since Y
obtains a better tactical return by firing at X
2 ,
but a
better strategic return by firing at X . At the termina-
tion of the battle, only the tactical return need be con-
sidered, so clearly, <J>*(T) = as long as there are any X 2
survivors at T.
However, since Y is more effective in destroying X^s
kill capability than X 2 's, it is in Y's best interest to
fire at Xj until there is just enough time remaining to




IV. THE STOCHASTIC MODEL
A. STOCHASTIC CONTROL PROBLEMS
The addition of stochastic elements to the optimal
control problem Introduces several complications. There
are a number of aspects which must be considered, since
different interpretations lead to different courses of
action. ' These are discussed at length by Dreyfus [13].
The state of knowledge of the underlying stochastic
process must be considered. In the simplest case, the
properties of the process may be known. On the other hand,
if the nature of the process is not known, a learning
element enters the problem. The course of action chosen
must be refined as the process evolves and knowledge is
gained. This is known as an adaptive control problem.
Another important factor is the ability to observe
the state of the system. In the simplest case, the state
can be observed precisely at any particular point. If the
state is only partially observable, then an estimation
problem must also be treated.
Since the trajectory is no longer precisely determined,
the objective function becomes a random variable-. Among
the alternatives for treating the objective function are:
the maximization of an expected value; maximizing the
probability of reaching a particular state; or minimizing
the variance of the terminal state.
22

A significant difference from the deterministic problem
is that the manner in which the control is applied leads
to different results. There are three basic control poli-
cies to be considered: open loop; feedback; and open
loop-feedback
.
An open loop control policy represents the case in
which the control must be specified before the process
starts and cannot be altered. In a process evolving
through time, the control is expressed as a function of
time, given the initial state.
A feedback or close loop policy assumes the ability
to continuously observe the state of the system and modify
the control. Mathematically, the control is expressed as
a function of time and state, given the initial state.
The open loop-feedback policy arises if it is impossible
to continuously observe the system. Generally, the system
can be observed only at particular points in time. In
this case, an open loop control based on the initial state
is applied to start the process. After an interval of time,
the state is observed and another open loop control is
applied, based on the observed state. This continues until
the process terminates.
It is fairly obvious that the feedback policy is the
"best" of the three. The process can be rigidly controlled
since, should the process start to behave in a nonoptimal
fashion, it can be corrected immediately. In an open loop
situation, a more delicate touch is required. There is no
23

way to correct any over-control. The open loop-feedback
corresponds to the physical situation usually faced in the
actual problem, as opposed to the model.
In the following section, a feedback control will be
found for a model where the underlying process is known
and the states are fully observable.
B. EXACT SOLUTION OP THE STOCHASTIC MODEL
This model differs from the deterministic model in
the structure of the attrition mechanism. The physical
situation is the same as in Section II. Assumptions Al
through A6 and A8 are retained. A7 is replaced by
A7 ' . Only integer casualties can occur and Y can
allocate only integer numbers of troops.
The objective function is
MAX E{ry(T) - px^T) - qx„(T))
This model treats the prescribed duration battle. For
reasons similar to those of the deterministic model, it Is
convenient to work in backwards time, t = T-t where T is
the prescribed termination time.
Instead of a deterministic square law attrition mecha-
nism, the attrition is modelled as a stationery Markov
process. The following probability statements are assumed
for a sufficiently small increment of time Ax:
A9
.
Prob [ one Xi casualty in Ax] = a.y^Ax
Prob [ more than one X
1
casualty in Ax] = o(Ax)
Prob [ one X 2 casualty in Ax] = (l-<{>) a 2 yAx
24

Prob [more than one X
2
casualty in Ax] = o(At)







Prob [more than one Y casualty in At] = o(At)
Prob [more than one casualty of any type in At]
= o(At)
where o(At) is a quantity such that lim ———- = 0. Given
At+0
the above, it follows that
P [no Xj casualties in At] = 1 - <j>a vAt + o(At)
and similarly for X
2
and Y.
The assumption that Y has perfect information about
the state of the system at any time and the ability to
instantaneously shift fire leads to a feedback or closed
loop optimal control.
To solve this model, the optimal expected value function,
S,is defined as
S[t, Xi (t), x 2 (t), y(T)] = E[ry(0) - px^O) - qx 2 (0)]
given that the state at time t is x^t), x
2
(t) and y(T)
and that an optimal control has been applied in the interval
[0,t].
Table III lists five .events which could take place in
an interval of length At, [t, t-At] and their probability
of occurrence. An expression for S(t, x , x
,
y) is
developed by the application of Bellman's Principle of
Optimality [l'J] which states:
25

Table III. Transition Probabilities
State @t Casualties Probability






Xj-l a x 2 , y one X cj^yAT
x lS x 2 -l, y one X 2 (l-(f))a 2 yAT
x lS x 2 , y-1 one Y (bjXj + b 2 x 2 )AT
Various more than 1 o(Ax)
An optimal policy has the property that, whatever the
initial state and initial decision are, the remaining
decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard
to the state resulting from the first decision.
By definition, the return from any of the states listed in
Table III resulting from following an optimal policy to







the optimal value of <\> in the interval [t, t~At] is the
one which maximizes the return expected, starting from
state x ls x 2 , y at time t. This can be expressed as
S[t, x., x
,
y] = max {[1 - {<|>a y + (l-<f>)a y
0<<f><l
+ b,x, + b^x„}Ai]S(T-AT,x
1
,x


















+ b 2 x 2 )ATS(T-Ax,x l ,x 2 ,y-l) + o(At)}
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Since S(t-At, x 15 x 2 , y) does not depend on the control
variable,
<J>
, this can be rewritten as
S(T
a
x lS x 2 , y) - S(t-At, x l5 x 2 , y)
= max {(bjXj + b 2 x 2 ) [S(t-At , x x , x 2 , y-1)
0<<J><1
-S(t-At, x is x 2 , y)]
+ yf^a^SCi-AT, Xj-lj x 2 , y) - S(t-At, x 19 x 2 , y)]
+ (l-<j))a 2 [S(T-AT, x ls x 2 -l, y) - S(t-At, x x , x 2 , y)]
4. POT) 1
In the limit as At-*0 3







x 2 )[S(T, Xj., x 2 , y-1)
- S(t, Xj, x
2 , y)]
+ y max {<$>(& [S(t, x -1, x , y) - S(t, x , x 2 , y)]
0<<J><1
- a [S(t, x
x
,
x 2 -1, y) - S(t, x l9 x 2 , y)]) (12)
+ a
2
[S(T, x , x
2
-l, y) - S(t, x
x
,
x 2 , y)]
27

Equation 12 can also be obtained directly from Kushner's
general result on the optimal control of a "Poisson"
2process [15]
•












(S(T, Xj, x 2 -l, y) - S(t, x x , x2 , y)} (13)
is used. Equation 12 then becomes
dS(x, x p x , y)





- S( T , x
x
, x 2 , y)}
+ a
2
y{S(T, x j5 x 2 -l s y) - S( T , x 2 , x 2 , y)f
+ y max { 4> v/ ( t )
}
0<cf)<l
Clearly, the optimal control is given by
fl w(t) >
<j)*( T ) =
[0 w(t) <
In the deterministic case where the optimal control
depended on the dual variables, it was necessary to treat
the case where a force is driven to zero separately since
2This contains a typographical error. The unnumbered
equation after Eq
. 7 should read
n n







If i = l, this reduces to Dreyfus result [13].
28

the boundary influenced the solution for the dual varia-
bles. In the stochastic case, the optimal control depends
only on the optimal expected value function. As shown
below, the initial conditions for S are easily determined
even when a force is driven to zero. Therefore, no special
distinction between the fixed duration and the fight to
the finish battles is necessary to solve for the optimal
expected value function.
If t=0 (i.e. at the end of the battle), then
S(0, x l? x 2 , y) = ry - px> - qx 2 (llj)
for all values x, , x 2 , and y.






, 0) = - (pxj + qx 2 ) (15)





= 0, there is no battle and
S(t, 0, 0, y) = ry (l6)
for all values of t and y.
IfXj = 0, then clearly, <J> = for all t and Eq . 12
reduces to
dS(x, 0, x,, y)2





-l, y) - S(x, 0, x
2 ,
y)]
with the initial condition from Eq . 14
S(0, 0, x 2 , y) = ry - qx 2 .
29

In particular, for x
2
= y = 1




[S(T, 0, 1, 0) - S(T, 0, 1, 1)]
+ a
2
[S(x, 0, 0, 1) - S(x, 0, 1, 1)]
= b
2
[-q-S(T, 0, 1, 1)] + a 2 [r-S(x, 0,1,1)]
using Eqs. 15 and 16 or
dS(x, 0, 1, 1)
dx
= - (b, + a,)S(T 3 0, 1, 1) + a,r - b 2 q
with S(0, 0, 1, 1) = r - q. This is an ordinary differen-
tial equation of the form
dx
_
dt " c i x
+ c
2
which is easily solved to give
S(x, 0, 1, 1)
fa 2 r - b 2
q'
fbjr - a ?V
a 2 + b 2






= 0, then <j> = 1 for all t and for
x
,
= y = lj Eq. 12 reduces to
dS( T , 1, 0, 1)
dx b^-p-Sd, 1, 0, 1)} + a^r-SCx, 1,0,1)}




































)[S(x 5 1, 1, 0) - S(t, 1, 1,1)
+ a,[S(i, 1, 0, 1) - S(t, 1, 1, 1)]




[S(i, 1, 0, 1) - S(t, 1, 1, 1)])} . (19)




(r~q-r+p+q) -a 2 (r-p-r+p+q)
= a
x
p - a 2 q




p Z a 2 q
4>*(x) = 1 for < t 5 ij where x, is the time when Y






This is consistent with the interpretation of a p as a
tactical measure. Certainly, at the end of the battle,
31

Y should direct his fire to get the greater return. In
this case, Eq . 19 becomes






){S(T, i, l, 0) - S(t, 1,1,1)}
+ a
1
{S(x, 0, 1, 1) - S(t, 1, 1, 1)}
with the initial condition
S(0, 1, 1, 1) = r - p - q.
Substituting Eqs. 15 and 17, the solution is given by
S(t, 1, 1, 1) =
aj (b 2 r - a 2 q)
( a, + b L - a 2 )(a 2 + b 2 )
exp <" ^ 2 +b 2 ) T )
[ ( b j - a 2 )(b 1 + b 2 ) + a j b j ] r a i
p






































(bj + b 2 )p [(b : + b 2 )(a 2 + b 2 ) + a^Dq'
(a
1




+ b 2 )(a 1 + b 1 + b 2 )
for < T < t .
i
Using this in Eq . 13, the switching time x, is deter-
mined. Depending on the value of T, it may be that t
,
>T
and so no switch occurs during the battle. If t <T, then
in the interval Tj 1 t 1 t, where t 2 is the time of switch
from X
2
back, to X 1? (w(x 2 ) = 0) , <|>*(t) = and
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- a. )(a + b ) f exp{-(a 1 +b 1 )T}


















































- Tl )J + (ai+bi )(a 2+ b 2Tb7J
C(b
x
+ by) (a, + b
x
















where S = S(x
, 1, 1, 1).
2. Case II
a„q > a,p
In this case, cf>(x) = for f x 1 x
x
where x is the




. For this interval
O ( Y) T1 — r^ X~) )
S(x, 1, l 5 1) =















































If t^T, then for t
x















) + a 2 bj]
( a
i
+b lHa 2 +t) 2 +b l )
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With S(t, 1,1,1) known, there is no mathematical reason
why Eq. 11 cannot be solved for S(t,2,1,1), S(t, 1,2,1),
etc. in hopes that eventually a general solution for
SdjXjjX ,y) might emerge. For the stochastic model corre-
sponding to the linear law attrition process, such a general
solution has been obtained by Clark [16].
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No general solution for this model is known. From
the • complexity of the expression for S(t, 1,1,1), it is
obvious that extensions will quickly become very unwieldy.
A numerical approximation for S(t,x ,x ,y) appears to be
a more profitable line of approach.
C. NUMERICAL APPROXIMATION OF THE STOCHASTIC MODEL
In the development of the differential difference
equation for S(x ,x
1
,x ,y ) , a suitable numerical approxima-
tion was also developed.
S(t+At,x. ,x_ ,y) = max \ (1 - {<J>a y + (l-<J>)a y
0<<f><l I







2 ,y) + ^a^AiS (t ,x l -1 ,x 2 ,y )














with $ determined by the value of the switching function
w(x ) in Eq. 13
.
This is essentially the Euler method of numerical
approximation. It has the advantage that as At-*-0, the




To obtain a reasonable approximation, the value of
the time step, Ax, must' be small. There is also an addi-
tional restriction on At. In order for the probability



















for all values of x, , x £ and y considered.
There are several special cases of Eq . 11





,0) = - px
1
- q x 2
S(T,0,0,y) = ry





{S( T> > x 2S y-l) - S(T,0 J x 2 ,y)
since <j> = 1 in this case and
S(t+At,x
1
,0,y) = S(x,x lS 0,y)
+ Ailb^^Sd^x^O^-l) - S(x,x
i
,0,y)}





= in this case.
The above equations were programmed in Fortran IV G
and run on an IBM 360/67. The output is a table which
gives S as a function of t for fixed values of x , x 2 ,
and y
.
In the special case of S(t, 1,1,1), the accuracy of the
approximation was checked against the exact solution
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developed in Section III B. The results of one such
comparison are given in Table IV . It can be seen that
the approximation agrees v/ith the exact solution to the
fourth decimal place.
For a given force level, the approximation must first
calculate the values of S for all combinations of smaller
force levels. For larger force levels, this requires
a large amount of computer time and memory. For a rela-
tively large time step of At = .01, computation of
S(t,5 3 5j5) for 1 x < 50 required about four minutes and
200 K of core. To solve the same problem for S(t,9,9,9)
would require about one hour and 500 K. Therefore, the
numerical results from this particular approach are
limited to relatively small force levels.
37
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V. COMPARISON OF RESULTS
For the 125 combinations of force levels from
x = x = y = 1 up to and including Xj = x 2 = y = 5 3
calculations were carried out for each of the four sets
of parameter values listed in Table V. A time step of
.01 minutes was used in the numerical approximation.
Comparisons of selected results are given in Tables VI
through XIV.
These tables were constructed by extracting the force
level time history from the deterministic model. Since
the deterministic model calculates force levels as contin-
uous functions of time, there is a question as to exactly
when a casualty occurs. For these tables, deterministic
force levels are rounded up to the next integer, i.e.
Xj = 3.001 is rounded to x
x
= 4. With these values of
time and force levels, the optimal expected value function
and the value of <f>* were obtained from the appropriate
stochastic table. All comparisons are for the case ajP<a 2 q
In the case a p > a
2 q, calculations were carried for
the above force level combinations with parameter set 1.
In both the stochastic and deterministic model, there is
no shift of fire unless x is driven to zero.
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P q r T
1 .005 .003 .007 .001 .15 .45 .4 50
2 .005 .003 .007 .001 .15 .45 .4 100
3 .025 .015 .035 .005 .75 2.25 2.0 50
4 .05 .03 .07 .01 1.5 4.5 4.0 50
Table VI. Comparison for Xj(0) = x
2
(0) = y(0) = 1
with Parameter Set 2





















(0) = y(0) = 5
with Parameter Set 2







5 5 5 1
27 5 5 4 1
50 4 5 4 1
55 1 5 4 1
56 *1 5 3 1
56. 38 4 5 3
87 4 5 2














Table VIII. Comparison for x^O) = 4 x
2 (0) = 5 y(0) = 5
with Parameter Set *4
Time Force Level
<f>








(0) = 5 y(0) = 3










k k 5 14
7 4 5 3
9 k 5 2
10 l\ H 2
13 l\ 4 1












2 y Det ermi
2 5 3 1
13 2 5 2 1
18 1 5 2 1
31 1 5 1 1
35. 39 1 5 1 1
41. 28 1 5 1













Table X. Comparison for x
x
(0) = 4 x 2 (0) = 5 y(0) = 5
with Parameter Set 2





3 5 4 1
9 3 5 3 1
13 2 5 3 1
20 2 5 2 1
34 2 5 1 1
36
•
1 5 1 1
41. 276 1 5 1










Deterministic Pay-off -11. 6727
Terminal State SI
Table XI. Comparison for x^O) = 4 x (0) = 5 y(0) = 5
with Parameter Set 2






7 4 5 4
13 4 5 3
19 •4 5 2
20 4 4 2
25 4 4 1













Table XII. Comparison for x '(0). » 4 x (0) = .4 y(0) = 5
with Parameter Set 2
















7 4 4 4
10 3 4 4
16 3 1 3
23 2 4 3
26 2 4 2
39 2 1} 1
41. 28 2 4 1

















• 3 5 k
9 3 5 3
13 2 5 3
20 2 5 2
34 2 5 1
36 1 5 1
41. 28 1 5 1










Table XIII. Comparison for x^O) = 3 *
2
(0) = 5 y(0) = 4
with Parameter Set 2














(0) = y(0) = 5 with
Parameter Set 1












5.61 5 5 5
6.38 5 5 5
26 5 5 k










Due to the restrictions of the stochastic model to
small force levels because of computer constraints, it is
difficult to reach any general conclusions. There are,
however, several Interesting things which can be observed
from the data.




p, the models lead to target
selection rules where the time fire is shifted differs by
as much as seven minutes. If the deterministic rule is to
shift fire before X
1
is destroyed, the stochastic rule is
to shift fire at an earlier time. This can be explained by
an interpretation of the model parameters similar to that
given in Section III.
The return obtained by firing at X
l
is mainly from
destroying his kill capability. More Y's survive for a
longer period of time. ' As the battle progresses, the
utility of Y survivors in the future decreases until a
point is reached where the return from firing at X drops
off rapidly. Conversely, the return from firing at X is
chiefly from destroying his value. As the battle progresses
the return from firing at X, eventually exceeds that of
firing at X . In the deterministic model, this crossover
point is known precisely. On the other hand, this cross-
over point is not precisely known in the stochastic model.
The use of expected values tends to force an earlier shift
48

to keep away from the area where the X return decreases
rapidly. In other words, some of the future value of Y
survivors is sacrificed to ensure that the higher return
from firing at X
2




2 q, this does not occur since it is always to Y's
advantage to fire at X l5 both in terms of value destroyed
and future survivors.
The large jump in the optimal expected value function
as casualties occur is caused by the integer constraints
on the stochastic model. This does not happen in the
deterministic model since force levels are calculated as
continuous functions. As t * T, the optimal expected value
function approaches the deterministic pay-off.
There are a number of areas which need additional work.
Most obvious is the need for better numerical techniques
for the stochastic model. One alternative is to reprogram
the model to use tape storage rather than core. In this
way, a series of small computer runs could be used to build
up a file of values for smaller force levels which could
then be accessed to compute still higher force levels. In
this case, an investigation of the truncation errors would
have to be made to determine the degree of accuracy in the
figures for higher force levels.
Another alternative is to consider a diffusion approxi-
mation to the stochastic process. Some work in this area
has been done by Taylor [10], leading to a parabolic partial
differential equation which is not easily solved
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analytically. It can be solved numerically. This approach
appears promising since it would not be necessary to solve
for all combinations of force levels below the desired ones.
This approach to the stochastic model yields no informa-
tion about the time history of the average force levels
or the probability of winning. Clark [16] was able to
obtain expressions for the average force levels in the
linear law case. If a similar solution for the square law
case could be obtained, more meaningful comparisons could
be made
.
There are also a number of extensions to the determin-
istic model. The zero-one nature of the solution is hardly
realistic. It is a result of the square law attrition
mechanism and the constant attrition coefficients. One
area of investigation would be to make the attrition coef-
ficients a function of the fire being received. Other
areas of extension are the two-on-two, one-on-m, and m-on-n
battles with various types of attrition mechanisms and
coefficients
.
In summary, the numerical results, while inconclusive,
do indicate a significant difference in results between
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